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Liquefaction is a frequently occurring problem taking place when transporting wet granular solid bulk cargoes on board bulk
carriers. Liquefaction of a solid bulk cargo can occur when excessive dynamic loading, induced by rough seas and vessel vibrations,
is transmitted to the cargo. From 1988 to 2015, there have been 24 suspected liquefaction incidents reported, which resulted in 164
casualties and the loss of 18 vessels. The objective of this study is to investigate the collective causes of liquefaction of solid bulk
cargoes on board bulk carriers in order to make recommendations to prevent future incidents from occurring. This was achieved
by analysing the seven available investigative reports relating to the incidents, focusing on the key findings and exploring the effect
of excess moisture within the cargo. This study has placed significant emphasis on the importance of preventing ingress of water
into the cargo during transportation, loading, and storage. Recommendations have been given, based on the key findings from the
reports, to reduce the potential for liquefaction incidents to occur.
1. Introduction
Liquefaction is a frequently occurring problem taking place
when transporting wet granular solid bulk cargoes on board
bulk carriers [1–3]. Similar to liquefaction of soils during
earthquakes [4–7], liquefaction of a solid bulk cargo occurs
when excessive cyclic or dynamic loading, induced by rough
seas and vessel vibrations, is transmitted to the cargo [8]. Car-
goes that are more likely to undergo liquefaction in the holds
of bulk carriers are those that contain sufficient amounts of
moisture and fine particles [9–12].
Liquefaction, in soil mechanics, is a term used to describe
the behaviour of amaterial that flows in amanner resembling
a liquid when subjected to monotonic, cyclic, or shock
loading.This behaviour is caused by pore pressures changing
within thematerial, which results in the loss of effective stress
and therefore shear strength [6, 13, 14]. Liquefaction does not
cease until the loading is reduced causing the shear stresses
acting on themass to be as low as the reduced shear resistance
[15]. Although further investigation is needed, some inci-
dents attributed to liquefaction may also be more accurately
described as cyclic instability, which is a form of unstable
behaviour (strain softening) caused by a succession of
dynamic load cycles [9, 16, 17].
If liquefaction of a solid bulk cargo occurs, it can cause the
vessel to list and occasionally capsize [18]. During this study
it has been found that, from 1988 to 2015, there have been 24
suspected liquefaction incidents reported, which resulted in
164 casualties and the loss of 18 vessels.
The International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes Code
(IMSBC Code), published by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), is an internationally recognized code
of safe practice to be followed when transporting hazardous
solid bulk cargoes on board bulk carriers [19]. In 2011 the
IMSBC Code, formally the Code of Safe Practice for Solid
Bulk Cargoes (BC Code), was made mandatory under the
SOLAS Convention [20]. Included in Appendix 2 of the
IMSBC Code are test methods to be followed when a cargo is
classified as “Group A” or liquefiable [19].These test methods
include the flow table, penetration, and Proctor/Fagerberg
tests, which are described in detail in related publications [11,
21, 22].The results from these tests provide the shipper with a
“safe” moisture content at which the cargo can be loaded
without being at risk of liquefying [19].
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Advances in Materials Science and Engineering
Volume 2016, Article ID 5219474, 20 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/5219474
2 Advances in Materials Science and Engineering
Table 1: Major incidents investigated during this study along with the main vessel and incident details [23, 25–30].
Case
study # Vessel name
IMO
numbera
Date of
incident
Casualties/#
crew Vessel lost Disembarked Cargo
Cargo
(tonnes)
1 Padang Hawk 9109354 26 July 1999 0/20 No Kouaoua, NewCaledonia Nickel ore N/A
2 Hui Long 9037032 20 May 2005 0/23 Yes Sungai Pakning,Indonesia Fluorspar 5,185
3 Jian Fu Star 8106379 27 Oct 2010 13/25 Yes Obi Island, Indonesia Nickel ore 43,000
4 NascoDiamond 9467861 09 Nov 2010 22/25 Yes
Kolonodale,
Indonesia Nickel ore 55,150
5 Hong Wei 9230139 3 Dec 2010 10/24 Yes Kolonodale,Indonesia Nickel ore 40,000
6 TransSummer 9615468 14 Aug 2013 0/21 Yes Subaim, Indonesia Nickel ore 54,067
7 Bulk Jupiter 9339947 02 Jan 2015 18/19 Yes Kuantan, Malaysia Bauxite 46,400
aThe IMO number is a distinctive reference number of a vessel [31].
This “safe” moisture content is known as the trans-
portable moisture limit (TML) and its inferred definition
is “the maximum gross water content that a liquefiable
cargo may contain without being at risk of liquefying while
being transported in a bulk carrier” [19]. The flow moisture
point (FMP) is also determined using two of the three
methods stated in the IMSBC Code. The TML is 90% of
the FMP [19]. Along with these test methods, other policies
and procedures are included to reduce the occurrence of
liquefaction incidents and ensure liquefiable cargoes do not
get loaded on a bulk carrier if it exceeds its TML.
One final method in the IMSBC Code used to determine
if a cargo is potentially liquefiable is the “CanTest.” If aMaster
has doubts in regard to the appearance or condition of the
material, a simplified in situ testing method for providing a
rough idea on the possibility of flowmay be carried out by half
filling a cylindrical vessel of about 1 litre capacity with a sam-
ple of the cargo and striking it against a hard surface at least 25
times. If free moisture appears on the surface of the sample,
additional laboratory tests should be conducted [19, 23].
Some other physical properties that influence the lique-
faction potential of “Group A” cargoes are the particle size,
void ratio, degree of saturation, hydraulic conductivity, and
pore air/water pressure characteristics [9–11]. Additionally,
some system variables is the induced cyclic loading, drainage
conditions, and rate of loading. The moisture content is con-
sidered the major factor regarding the liquefaction potential
of “Group A” cargoes. It is noted that all the test methods
given in the IMSBC Code use the moisture content of the
cargo as a variable that can be monitored and adjusted
accordingly to prevent cargoes from liquefying. Other phys-
ical properties of the cargo are not considered changeable to
prevent liquefaction of the cargoes [19]. This is because the
majority of cargoes being transported on bulk carriers are
considered products and therefore their physical properties
are more or less unalterable.
The objective of this study is to investigate the collective
causes of liquefaction of solid bulk cargoes on board bulk
carriers in order to make recommendations to prevent future
incidents from occurring. This will be achieved by analysing
the available investigative reports relating to the incidents,
focusing on the key findings and exploring the effect of excess
moisture within the cargo.
2. Case Studies
In order to make recommendations to prevent future liq-
uefaction incidents from occurring, investigation reports
will be utilized to summarize seven incidents including
the conclusions and key findings. These seven investigation
reports are the only publicly available reports of suspected
liquefaction incidents from 1988 to 2015. The list given in
Table 1 shows themajor incidents that are investigated during
this study along with the main vessel and incident details.
It is noted that the terms “sea state” and “wind force,”
given herein, are stated using theDouglas andBeaufort scales,
respectively [24]. All the case study summaries and conclu-
sions presented in Section 2 have been obtained from their
respective investigation reports [23, 25–30]. By summarizing
and analysing these incidents, we hope to determine trends or
similarities that may be causing these incidents to occur.
2.1. Case Study 1: Padang Hawk. Built in 1995, the Singapore
flag PadangHawk (IMO: 9109354) is a handymax bulk carrier
with a summer deadweight of 46,635 tonnes [32]. The vessel,
which has a length of 190m, breadth of 31m, and summer
draught of 12m, has five cargo holds serviced by four on-
board cranes [25]. At the time of producing this report the
Padang Hawk, now Panama flag Tong Ji Men, is still in active
service [33]. The Padang Hawk along with its hold and tank
layout can be seen in Figures 1 and 2.
2.1.1. Summary of Incident. On 17 July 1999 at 1224, the
PadangHawk arrived at the port of Kouaoua,NewCaledonia,
seen in Figure 3, to begin loading a cargo of nickel ore from
shore barges. Loading commenced at 1440 andwas completed
on 23 July by 2140. Each day during loading, soundings were
taken to record if any water was present in the cargo holds.
Although no bilge water was recorded during these sound-
ings, the crew noticed that some of crane “grabs” of the cargo
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Figure 1: The Padang Hawk [25].
had water running from them as they were transferred from
the barges into the cargo holds of the bulk carrier [25].
The Padang Hawk departed Kouaoua at 2307 on 23 July
on a north-westerly course along the coast of NewCaledonia.
At 1700 on 24 July, the ships logbook shows that the bilges
of all cargo holds were pumped dry while the vessel was
rolling heavily in south-easterly swells. Just before 2400 on
the same day, the PadangHawk altered course north of Re´cifs
d’Entrecasteaux. The vessel was rolling and pitching heavily
when thewindwas noted as being east-south-east and at force
5, and the sea was described as rough as the Padang Hawk
sailed west towards Townsville, Australia [25].
At 0900 on 25 July and 0830 on 26 July, the bilges in
all holds were again pumped. The rough conditions caused
the vessel to roll and pitch heavily, particularly from 1600
onwards on 25 July. At noon on 26 July, the PadangHawk was
about 100 nautical miles of Marion Reef, as seen in Figure 4.
During the afternoon, the wind strength was logged at force
5 with regular notations in the logbook concerning the ship’s
heavy rolling. Throughout the day, from time to time, seas
broke over the deck and hatch covers. By 2000, the wind was
logged at force 6-7 and the vessel was rolling heavily.The hold
bilges were pumped at 2000 and again at 2100 [25].
A little before 2200 the PadangHawk suddenly developed
a 15-degree list to port. After reducing speed and altering the
course to bring the wind and sea onto the port quarter, crew
were sent to check the hatches and the state of the main deck.
After noting that nothing was out of place, the crew opened
access hatches to each of the holds.They found that the cargo
of nickel ore in all the holds, except hold number 5, had settled
and shifted to port.The cargo in the first three holds appeared
to be semiliquid, “like melted ice cream,” as one of the crew
described it. Two images of the nickel ore in hold number 1
of the Padang Hawk can be seen in Figure 5 [25].
After using ballast to try to correct the list, a message was
sent to the AustralianMaritime Safety Authority (AMSA) via
the ships agent in Townsville noting the condition of the ship
and actions taken and reporting that the cargo had liquefied
[25].
By early morning, the list had been reduced to about
5 degrees by using the vessel’s double bottom ballast tanks,
which was recommended by the owners. The strong wind
and heavy swell continued and seas broke regularly over
the vessel’s quarter. The cargo hold bilges were pumped at
regular intervals throughout the day [25].
Due to the consistently rough weather, at noon on 27 July,
the Master decided to maintain the course with the wind
astern. This course took the Padang Hawk directly towards
Grafton Passage. In the early hours of 28 July, the ship was
approaching Grafton Passage. By 0400, it was safely in the
calmer waters inside the Great Barrier Reef and later that
afternoon the vessel anchored off Townsville. Once a pilot
boarded, the Padang Hawk was safely navigated and docked
at Townsville by 1930 [25].
2.1.2. Investigation Conclusions. Investigations into the inci-
dent started immediately after the Padang Hawk arrived at
Townsville, Australia.The following are themain conclusions
from the investigation into the incident involving the Padang
Hawk [25].
(1) The cargo was loaded with excessive moisture con-
tent.
(2) The vessel was subjected to heavy seas, which led to
the cargo changing state from a solid to a viscous
liquid in 4 of the 5 holds.
(3) Insufficient knowledge of the characteristics of nickel
ore as a cargo and its propensity to become fluid when
the moisture content is high and it is subjected to
sufficient physical stress.
(4) There is no test to specifically ascertain the trans-
portable moisture limit (TML) of nickel ore.
(5) The owners/agent of the vessel did not include in
Master’s voyage instructions the relevant information
pertaining to the cargo moisture content, flow tests,
andMaster’s right to refuse to load the cargo under the
terms of the agreement between the buyer, Queens-
land Nickel Pty Ltd. (QNPL), and the cargo sellers.
(6) The ore seller did not provide the Master with the
agreed data pertaining to the cargo’s moisture content
and flow tests as required by the SOLAS Convention.
(7) The Master loaded the nickel ore without insisting
on the provision of the data concerning the moisture
content and flow tests.
(8) The mined nickel ore was stockpiled in areas open to
the ingress of rainwater.
(9) The agreement between QNPL and the seller did not
stipulate a reasonable, maximum, acceptable mois-
ture content, based on the nickel ore’s ability to be
carried safely by sea.
Additionally, the flow table test, which is used to determine
the TML of coal and ore concentrates [19], was performed on
the cargo of nickel ore after the incident and themoisture con-
tent of the cargo was found to exceed the TML determined by
the test [25].
2.2. Case Study 2: Hui Long. Built in 1999, theHongKong flag
Hui Long (IMO: 9037032) was a handysize bulk carrier with
a summer deadweight of 16,113 tonnes [32].The vessel, which
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Figure 2: Padang Hawk and Jian Fu Star hold and tank layout [23, 25].
Figure 3: Port of Kouaoua, New Caledonia (source: Google Maps).
had a length of 158m and breadth of 23m had four cargo
holds serviced by three on-board cranes [29]. The Hui Long
can be seen in Figure 6.
2.2.1. Summary of Incident. On 1 May 2005, the Hui Long
arrived in Hong Kong from China and was loaded with 5,185
tonnes of fluorspar in hold number 1 and the lower part of
hold number 3, as seen in the stowage plan in Figure 7. Load-
ingwas carried out by grabs from the barges thatweremoored
alongside the vessel [29].
According to the weather and crew reports, there had
been slight showers on the day of loading, which did not
impair the loading of the cargo. After completion, samples
from the two holds were taken and a certificate of moisture
content was issued.The certificate indicated that themoisture
content of the fluorspar cargo was at 9.8%.The certificate did
not provided the details of the transportable moisture limit
(TML) of the fluorspar [29].
The next day the vessel sailed to Singapore to unload a
cargo of aluminium ingots and steel angle bars where it was
reported that there had been intermittent rain showers during
the cargo operation and that the crew would close hatch
covers numbers 2, 3, and 4 when raining.The vessel departed
Singapore on 11 May for Sei Pakning, Indonesia, to load
a cargo of wood pulp. Again, during loading, it was reported
that there had been occasional rain showers and the ship’s
crew had to close hatch covers numbers 2, 3, and 4 during
the rain, as wood pulp cargo is susceptible to rainwater. After
loading was completed on 14 May, the Hui Long departed
Sei Pakning, Indonesia, for India loaded with a deadweight
of 11,244 tonnes including the 5,185 tonnes of fluorspar. The
vessel was upright and in normal working condition on its
departure and it was indicated that the vessel had no major
structural problems [29].
On 18 May, the Hui Long was proceeding off Sumatra
on a westerly course. The weather was fine with moderate
sea and south-westerly wind at force 5. Occasional moderate
rolling of vesselmovementwas experienced. According to the
Master, ship movement was normal and there was no severe
rolling during the voyage [29].
On 18 May at approximately 1535, the Hui Long suddenly
developed a 15-degree list to port. The bridge navigating
officer stated that the vessel was navigating normally with no
irregularities and rolledmoderately approximately 10 degrees
to both sides before the list. After reporting the incident, the
Master informed the engineers to upright the vessel by filling
the starboard double bottom tanks.The crewswere not able to
upright the vessel with ballasting due to the severe listing [29].
An image of the Hui Long listing severely to port can be seen
in Figure 8.
At 1602, as the list worsened to 40 degrees to port, the
Master decided to abandon the vessel. At this time, the port
deck edge of the vessel was immersed under the sea. A nearby
container vessel and themanagement company inChinawere
made aware of the situation [29].
The nearby container vessel successfully rescued all
crewmembers from the water and the life rafts. A salvage tug
arrived at the scene the following day but the vessel sank 49
hours and 43 nautical miles north-east of the initial listing
position. There were no casualties reported in the incident
[29].
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Figure 4: Padang Hawk’s approximate voyage from Kouaoua, New Caledonia to Townsville, Australia [25].
Figure 5: Images of the nickel ore in hold number 1 of the Padang Hawk [25].
Figure 6: The Hui Long [29].
2.2.2. Investigation Conclusions. The following are the main
conclusions from the investigation into the sinking of theHui
Long [29].
(1) The exact cause of the sinking of “Hui Long” could
not be established.
(2) After investigating the probable causes of the acci-
dent, it is believed to be the liquefaction of the
fluorspar cargo inside holds numbers 1 and 3. The
flow state of the fluorspar cargomight have caused the
vessel to list, capsize, and sink.
(3) The Master appeared to have not followed the com-
pany’s cargo safety manual for loading a bulk cargo
that may liquefy by accepting on board for shipment
of fluorspar cargo with the moisture content higher
than the stipulated 8%.
(4) The shipper has failed to provide the TML of the
fluorspar cargo before the shipment as required by
theMerchant Shipping (Safety) (Carriage of Cargoes)
Regulation and the BC Code, while a norm of 10%
TML for bulk fluorspar was used by the shipper with-
out documentation support of any laboratory test. As
such it is possible that the fluorspar cargo at moisture
content of 9.8% had exceeded the actual TML.
(5) The amount of sample taken by the survey firm
would not be sufficient for a proper determination of
moisture content as far as the BC Code is concerned.
2.3. Case Study 3: Jian Fu Star. Built in 1982, the Panama flag
Jian Fu Star (IMO: 8106379) was a handymax bulk carrier
with a deadweight of 45,107 tonnes [32]. The vessel, which
had a length of 190m, breadth of 31m, and summer draught
of 11m, had five cargo holds serviced by four cranes [23].
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Figure 7: Hui Long’s cargo stowage plan on departure from Sei Pakning [29].
Figure 8: Hui Long listing severely to port after suspected liquefac-
tion of the cargo of Fluorspar [29].
Figure 9: The Jian Fu Star [35].
The Jian Fu Star, as seen in 2008 as Elene [34], along with the
hold and tank layout can be seen in Figures 9 and 2.
2.3.1. Summary of Incident. On 16 October 2010 at approx-
imately 1900, the Jian Fu Star arrived at an Obi Island port
in Indonesia, one of which can be seen in Figure 10. Loading
commenced on 17 October at 0200 and was completed on 20
October by approximately 1400.TheMaster andChief Officer
noted that the cargo was dry in appearance and to the touch,
similar to previous loadings condition. Due to the visually
dry appearance of the cargo, theMaster and Chief Officer did
not carry out any tests to determine its moisture content [23].
Figure 10: Port of Kawassi, Obi Island, Indonesia (source: Google
Maps).
The stowage plan for the Jian Fu Star for this voyage can be
seen in Figure 11.
The vessel loaded 23,800 tonnes of nickel ore continu-
ously depending on the inflow of barges and halting during
periods of occasional showers. After theMaster noted that the
moisture content of the nickel ore was less than the shipper’s
earlier declaration, the Jian Fu Star departed Obi Island,
Indonesia, on the 20 October at approximately 1800 bound
for Lazhou, China [23].
During loading, there were no reports of damage to the
bulk carrier by either the barges or grab cranes. The journey
from Obi Island to just off Lazhou was uneventful and the
weather was reported to be fine with calm sea states. On
26 October at approximately 1000, as the vessel continued
towards Lazhou, the wind shifted to a strong northerly with
a force of 5 to 6. By 1400 the wind had increased to force of 7
to 8 and sea conditions worsened causing the vessel to pitch
heavily and roll moderately [23].
On 27October at approximately 0700, as the sea remained
rough and swell heavy, the vessel listed suddenly 5 degrees
to port and did not upright itself. Procedures began to try
to upright the vessel by reducing the port and increasing the
starboard tank ballast along with transferring fuel from port
to starboard. Even after these measures were implemented,
the vessel’s list increased to 10-degree port [23].
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Figure 11: Stowage plan for the Jian Fu Star [23].
At this time, the general alarm was raised and the Master
notified the company in charge. During this time, the vessel’s
list had increased dramatically to where the port deck was
level with the sea. Due to the inevitable capsizing of the vessel,
a distress signalwas activated and the abandon ship alarmwas
sounded.The vessel sank within a 20-minute period from the
initial list. Of the 25 crewmembers on board the Jian Fu Star,
12 were rescued [23].
2.3.2. Investigation Conclusions. The following are the main
conclusions from the investigation into the sinking of the Jian
Fu Star [23].
(1) The exact cause of the sinking of Jian Fu Star could not
be establishedwith absolute certainty as the vessel had
completely sunk.
(2) The mined nickel ore was stockpiled in areas open to
the ingress of rainwater.
(3) The cargo was loaded with suspected excessive mois-
ture content.
(4) The vessel was subjected to heavy seas, which led to
the cargo changing state from a solid to a viscous
liquid in all of its 5 holds.
(5) Insufficient knowledge of the characteristics of nickel
ore as a cargo and its propensity to become fluid when
the moisture content is high and it is subjected to
sufficient physical stress.
(6) It is highly believed the accident was a result of liq-
uefaction of the nickel ore inside the cargo holds that
caused the sudden list, capsize, and sinking of the Jian
Fu Star.
(7) There is no test to specifically ascertain the trans-
portable moisture limit (TML) of nickel ore.
(8) The owners/manager of the vessel did not have clear
instruction on the care and handling of such cargoes
as specified in its Safety Management System, espe-
cially relating to the procedures in accepting shipper’s
laboratory certificate, self-basic testing of the cargo
moisture content, and the procedures inMaster’s right
to refuse to load the cargo under the terms of the
agreement between the Chinese buyer and the cargo
sellers.
(9) The ore seller did provide the Master with data per-
taining to the cargo’s moisture content and flow tests
as required by SOLAS, but with respect to accuracy
and authenticity of the laboratory data, this was very
much in doubt.
(10) The Master and Chief Officer appeared to have not
followed strictly the IMSBCCode’s guideline and rec-
ommendation of carrying a basic “Can Test” to deter-
mine and compared the stated cargo specification
declaration supplied by the shipper.
(11) The shipper might have failed to provide accurately
the TML of the nickel ore before the shipment as
required by the IMSBC Code.
2.4. Case Study 4: Nasco Diamond. Built in 2009, the Panama
flag Nasco Diamond (IMO: 9467861) was a handymax bulk
carrier with a summer deadweight of 56,893 tonnes [32]. The
vessel, which had a length of 186m, breadth of 32m, and
summer draught of 13m, had five cargo holds serviced by
four on-board cranes [26].TheNascoDiamond can be seen in
Figure 12.
2.4.1. Summary of Incident. On 18 October 2010 at 2130, the
Nasco Diamond arrived at Kolonodale, Central Sulawesi,
Indonesia, seen in Figure 13, to begin loading a cargo of nickel
ore from shore barges, similar to what is seen in Figure 14.
Loading operations commenced at 2245 on 19 October. The
same day, the flow table test was carried out on a sample
of the cargo that was to be loaded on the Nasco Diamond.
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Figure 12: The Nasco Diamond [26].
Figure 13: Port of Kolonodale, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia (source:
Google Maps).
The representative sample that was tested was taken two days
prior to 16 October [26].
The results of the test showed that the moisture content
at time of sampling was 30.08% with a flowmoisture point of
37.00% and resulting transportable moisture limit of 33.25%.
It was noted that the barges carrying the nickel ore had no
protection from the “time to time, pouring” rain during the
passage and loading and that there was no sample taken for
the determination of moisture content after 16 October [26].
During loading, the Master was unsatisfied with the
condition of the nickel ore cargo that was being brought to
the vessel by the barges. On 2 November, a “note of protest”
was prepared andwithin stated, “Wefind the cargo in [the 12th
barge] is very wet and contains plenty of water. In view of the
above fact, I, the Master of the MV ‘Nasco Diamond’, regret to
submit this notice in advance to reject to receive this cargo, the
ship, owner is not responsible for any loss.” [26]. Photographs
were taken at this time and can be seen in Figure 15.The “note
of protest” was more or less ignored as the cargo was allowed
to be loaded being wet [26].
On 4 November at 1230, after the loading of 55,150 tonnes
of nickel ore was complete, the Nasco Diamond departed
Kolonodale, Indonesia. The stowage plan can be seen in
Figure 16. The vessel was reported to be in normal working
condition at the time of its departure [26].
The journey was uneventful until 9 November at 1111
when the Master reported to his respective supervisor that
the vessel was listing 3 degrees to port. After inspections of all
five holds, slurry was observed. It was noted that slurry was
observed in the aft section of hold number 1, in the aft section
of hold number 4 (approximately 50 to 60 cm depth), and in
the aft section of hold number 5 (approximately 20 to 40 cm
Figure 14: Loading operation at Kolonodale, Indonesia, similar to
that of the Nasco Diamond and Hong Wei [26].
depth). Holds numbers 2 and 3 were dry with no formation
of slurry [26].
At this time, the wind was north-easterly with force of 6
to 7, the sea was 3 meters in height and the vessel was rolling
between 0 degrees and 7 degrees on the port side.TheMaster
reported that his intent was to use ballast to try to correct the
vessel’s list but was instructed to wait for further instructions
[26].
At 1137, the Master was contacted by his respective super-
visor, whomhad gathered the company’s emergency response
team, and it was suggested that he adjusted his sailing course
to head windward, so as to minimize the rolling of the vessel.
It was also suggested he scooped the slurry into oil drums and,
with a submersible pump placed in the drum, attempted to
pump the slurry out of the vessel’s holds. Following that, the
Master was also instructed to take the sounding of all the bal-
last and oil tanks and to get the assistance of all crew on board
to assist in scooping the slurry except for those on duty [26].
At 1217, the captain reported that the removal of the slurry
was progressing and going well. At 1314, the Master reported
that the submersible pump had been placed in a bamboo
basket and was directly pumping the slurry from top of the
cargo. At this time, the Master also reported that the surface
of the cargo in the respective holds was uneven and all water
from the bilges had been drained out [26].
Sometime between 1650 and 1720, after reporting that the
vessel was now rolling between 5 degrees port to 2 degrees
starboard, the captain reported that the situation is rather
stable. From 1817 to 1825, the Master reported that the vessel
was swaying uniformly about 2.5 degrees and the vessel was
in stable conditionwith the sea state reduced to 2meters [26].
At 2030, the emergency response team called the Master
but there was no answer. From 2030 to 2041, the emergency
response team kept calling while also checking the status of
the vessel using the available satellite tracking. At 2230, after
continuing calls went unanswered and tracking was lost, the
emergency response team began search and rescue proce-
dures [26].
On 10 November at 0951, the emergency response team
was notified that a rescue plane located an oil slick on the sea
surface and located two life rafts. At 2330, they were also noti-
fied that three life rafts were located by other rescue planes.
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Figure 15: Photographs submitted to the head office by theMaster of the condition of the nickel ore cargo at the time of loading at Kolonodale,
Indonesia [26].
Hold 5 Hold 4 Hold 3 Hold 2 Hold 1
Nickel ore
11000 MT
Nickel ore
10350 MT
Nickel ore
11000 MT
Nickel ore
11400 MT
Nickel ore
11400 MT
Figure 16: Nasco Diamond stowage plan [26].
The name on the life rafts could not be read at the distances
they were seen but it was confirmed that they contained no
survivors. On 11 November rescue ships from Taiwan and
Japan found and rescued three crewmembers and retrieved
two dead bodies.The rescue operations ceased on 13 Novem-
ber at 2200 leaving 22 crewmembers deceased or missing
[26].
2.4.2. Investigation Conclusions. The following are the main
conclusions from the investigation into the sinking of the
Nasco Diamond [26].
(1) The exact cause of the sinking of Nasco Diamond
could not be established.
(2) The cargo as presented for loading was not in accor-
dance with the Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk
Cargoes (IMSBC Code). The cargo was loaded with
excessive moisture content as evident from the damp
cargo loaded from the barge and Master’s “note of
protest.”
(3) The IMSBC Code was not adhered to as stated in
Appendix 1.
(a) Under “Carriage,” “the appearance of the sur-
face of the cargo shall be checked regularly
during voyage. If free water above the cargo
or fluid state of the cargo is observed during
voyage, theMaster shall take appropriate actions
to prevent cargo shifting and potential capsize of
the ship and give consideration to seeking emer-
gency entry into a place of refuge.”
(b) Under “Weather Precautions,” the moisture
content of the cargo is more than the TML
during voyage.
(4) There is insufficient knowledge regarding the charac-
teristics of nickel ore as a cargo and its propensity to
become fluid when the moisture content is high and
it is subjected to sufficient physical stress. The vessel
was subjected to heavy seas, which led to the cargo
changing state from a solid to a viscous liquid in 3 of
the 5 holds.
(5) On completion of loading, there was no sample taken
to test to specifically ascertain the “transportable
moisture limit” of the nickel ore.The ore seller did not
provide the Master with the agreed data pertaining to
the cargo’s moisture content and flow tests as required
by SOLAS and BC Code (IMSBC Code).
(6) No evidence to indicate whether the owners/agents
of the vessel have included, in the Master’s voyage
instruction, the relevant information pertaining to
the cargo moisture content, flow tests, and Master’s
right to refuse to load the cargo under the terms of the
agreement between the cargo buyer and cargo seller.
(7) The Master loaded the nickel ore without insisting
on the provision of the data concerning the moisture
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Figure 17: The Hong Wei (source: Silvio Roberto Smera) [37].
content and flow tests of the cargo on board even after
physically seeing the ore arriving in wetted condition.
(8) The mined nickel ore was stockpiled and transported
in ways that allowed the ingress of rainwater.
(9) The vessel’s stability should have been calculated for
the loaded condition leaving Kolonodale, Indonesian,
and subsequently checked prior to the pumping of
ballast into the topside and double bottom tanks to
correct the list, if any.
(10) After investigation the probable causes of the acci-
dent, it is believed to be the liquefaction of the nickel
ore cargo inside holds numbers 1, 4, and 5. The flow
state of the nickel ore cargo might have caused the
vessel to list, capsize, and sink.
2.5. Case Study 5: Hong Wei. Built in 2001, the Panama flag
HongWei (IMO: 9230139) was a handymax bulk carrier with
a deadweight of 50,149 tonnes [32]. The vessel, which had a
length of 181m, breadth of 32m, and draught of 12m, had five
cargo holds serviced by four on-board cranes [27]. The Hong
Wei, as seen in 2006 as the Darya Dhyan [36], can be seen in
Figure 17.
2.5.1. Summary of Incident. On 6 November 2010 at 1820, the
Hong Wei arrived at Kolonodale, Central Sulawesi, Indone-
sia, seen in Figure 13, to begin loading a cargo of 48,900
tonnes of nickel ore from shore barges, similar to what is seen
in Figure 14 [27].
During loading, the Chief Engineer recalled that it rained
during two occasions and the cargo loading operations were
stopped during this time. Additionally, he could not recall if
during inspections of the cargo by the Chief Officer it was
found to be in dry conditions or not.
On 4 November, prior to the arrival of the Hong Wei at
Kolonodale, Indonesia, a flow table test was carried out to
determine the transportable moisture limit of the nickel ore
cargo.The results of the test showed that themoisture content
at time of sampling was 31.50% with a flow moisture point of
37.00% and resulting transportable moisture limit of 33.25%.
Loading operations were completed on 27 November
at approximately 1800 and the vessel departed Kolonodale,
Indonesia, for Lanshan, China, on the 28 November at
Table 2: Cargo distribution of the Hong Wei when departing
Kolonodale, Indonesia [27].
Cargo hold number Quantity of nickelore (tonnes)
1 8,600
2 10,100
3 9,700
4 10,100
5 10,400
Total 48,900
approximately 0600. The cargo distribution of the Hong Wei
can be seen in Table 2 [27].
The weather at the time of departure was fine with winds
of force 3 and slight seas. It was reported that from 28
November to 2 December, the wind force gradually increased
to force 4. The interviewed Bosun reported that every day, at
around 1500 to 1600, he usually checked the cargo holds and
that everything seemed normal [27].
On 3 December at approximately 1300, the Chief Engi-
neer felt a hard shock and reported that the vessel moved
from port to starboard heavily until the vessel returned to
the seminormal position. At approximately 1305, the captain
made an announcement requesting that the Bosun pumped
port top side tanks numbers 2, 3, and 4 to correct the list that
was reported to be approximately 3 degrees to the starboard
side [27].
While lifejackets were being donned, crewmembers left
their posts and moved towards the upper decks. As the cap-
tain tried to convince crewmembers to return to their respec-
tive places of work, the list of the vessel increased to 6 degrees
starboard. As the Chief Engineer made his way to the main
deck, he saw the vessel’s bow deck nearly touching the sea
surface and at this time he heard the abandon ship signal [27].
Some of the crew went to port side to try to release the
lifeboat but despite the efforts, it could not be released due to
the now 20-degree list to the starboard side. The Chief Engi-
neer lost hold of the railing and went into the sea with mul-
tiple crewmembers who were either in life rafts or also in the
sea [27].
At approximately 1800, a search and rescue helicopter
rescued the Chief Engineer and another crewmember while
another vessel rescued 12 more. 10 crewmembers are still
missing and presumed dead [27].
2.5.2. Investigation Conclusions. The following are the main
conclusions from the investigation into the sinking of the
Hong Wei [27].
(1) Many mines in the regions where these cargoes are
available to carry are very basic and are situated in
very remote locations, making it hard for surveyors
and experts to attend them.Moreover, it is not easy to
arrange for cargo samples to be tested independently
due to the lack of reliable laboratories in such coun-
tries.
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Figure 18: The Trans Summer [30].
(2) The nickel ore is mined from open quarries and
stored in open areas where stockpiles are susceptible
to heavy rainfall and high humidity prior to shipment.
In some cases, the ore is transported directly from the
mine to the vessel.
(3) The “solar drying” of stockpiles has limited effect and
rarely does more than dry the surface area of the ore.
No other processing is involved. The ore is typically
loaded into barges and transhipped to bulk carriers
waiting at anchor. Although the cargo presented for
shipment may appear to be dry, this is not a guide as
to whether the cargo is actually safe to carry.
(4) Nickel ore is nonhomogenous cargo and particle sizes
vary considerably.This creates problems for laborato-
ries when trying to ascertain the flow moisture point
fromwhich the transport moisture limit is calculated.
Local test facilities in these problem areas are not able
to complete the testing required by the new IMSBC
Code. The required shipping documentation, actual
moisture content, and transport moisture limit may
therefore be very inaccurate.
(5) The nonhomogenous nature of nickel ore means that
cargo loaded in different holds may be inconsistent
from one hold to the next with respect to the flow
moisture point of cargo in such different holds.
(6) In summary the evidence suggest that the direct cause
of this accident was the loss of stability as a result of
cargo liquefaction and shift in bad weather.
2.6. Case Study 6: Trans Summer. Built in 2012, the Hong
Kong flag Trans Summer (IMO: 9615468) was a handymax
bulk carrier with a summer deadweight of 56,824 tonnes [32].
The vessel, which had a length of 190m, breadth of 31m, and
summer draught of 13m, had five cargo holds serviced by
four on-board cranes [30]. The Trans Summer can be seen in
Figure 18.
2.6.1. Summary of Incident. On 15 July 2013, the Trans
Summer arrived at Subaim, Indonesia, seen in Figure 19, to
begin loading a cargo of nickel ore from shore barges. Prior to
arrival, on 10 July, a precaution notice was sent to the Master
reminding him to pay particular attention to the possible high
moisture content of the nickel ore cargo. Moreover, the “Can
Figure 19: Port of Subaim, Indonesia (source: Google Maps).
Test” should be conducted on each barge so as to satisfy
himself before loading the cargo on board [30].
Loading commenced on 17 July at 1230 after the Chief
Officer and Chief Engineer inspected the nickel ore mine.
Although theMaster had already received a cargo declaration
together with a moisture certificate issued by shipper, the
ChiefOfficer andChief Engineer did not verify the conditions
of cargo stockpiles nor were they aware whether the cargo
stockpiles would be covered by tarpaulins to prevent wetting.
The cargo declaration showed that the moisture content at
time of sampling was 33.87% and had a flow moisture point
of 38.66% with a resulting transportable moisture limit of
34.79% [30].
It was noted that it rained frequently during the loading of
cargo. To avoid rainwater wetting the cargo, the loading oper-
ation was suspended during these times. The crew on board
the vessel closed the cargo hold hatches while the stevedores
on the barges covered the cargo using tarpaulins [30].
A “Can Test” was performed on each barge prior to
transfer to the Trans Summer. The “Can Test” samples were
taken from approximately 1m below the cargo surface. If the
“Can Test” failed, the moisture content was determined and
if the moisture content was found to exceed the transportable
moisture limit then the cargo was rejected. The results of all
the cargomoisture content tests were recorded and sent to the
vessels owner [30].
Subsequently, all documents on the vessel including the
above records were lost in the accident. The information
regarding the cargo loading sequences was retrieved from
emails exchanged between the Trans Summer and the vessels
owner, as seen in Table 3 [30].
As seen inTable 3, on 23 July amoisture content certificate
was received; however, nobody on board the vessel checked
the cargo declaration and certificate. As a consequence, they
did not know the moisture content of cargo loaded into the
cargo holds from 24 to 30 July. On 30 July, the moisture
content certificate was checked by the crew and it was sent to
the company. It showed that the moisture content at time of
samplingwas 33.88% and had a flowmoisture point of 38.69%
and a resulting transportable moisture limit of 34.80%.
Table 3 revealed that the vessel accepted cargo on two occa-
sions with a moisture content exceeding the transportable
moisture limit [30].
The loading was completed on 6 August with the distri-
bution of cargo in the holds shown in Table 4. On 7 August
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Table 3: The loading sequence of the Trans Summer [30].
Date Stoppage due to
rain (hours)
Loaded
(tonnes)
“Can Test”
(s) Moisture content test Cargo rejected Remarks
17/07 1500–2400 310 MC certificatereceived
18/07 0000–0300,
1700–1900 4800
19/07 1600–2100 0 No loading operation
20/07 1300–1630 1283 1 (fail) Rejected one
21/07 0030–0230,
0800–1040 808 1
22/07 1430–1530,
2255–2330 1830
23/07 1630–1730,
1855–1930 1588 1 (fail)
Rejected one was
towed back
MC certificate
received. Did not
check
24/07 1730–2140 2204 1
25/07
0210–0525,
1820–1930,
2100–2250
2657 1
26/07
0300–0800,
1315–1505,
2000–2320
5587
27/07 2833
28/07 6394 1 1 0220–0745 stop dueto wet cargo
29/07 2213 1
30/07 1200–2400 1281 1 MC certificatereceived
31/07
0000–1000,
1150–1220,
1640–1720
5549
01/08 2115–2400 1382 1 1
02/08 4896
1 1 (MC 35.53% > TML) No information
At 0907 hours
company had enquiry
of why the cargo was
loaded on board
2 1 (MC 37% > TML) At 1250, drying in sunfor 4 hours
Rechecked by “Can
Test.” Cargo was
loaded o/b
03/08 3040 3 1
04/08 1340–1800 1809 2 2
05/08
0800–1500,
1525–1640,
1800–2010
1839
06/08 Completed loading 2488 2 0010–0800 stop dueto wet cargo
Total 26 stoppages 54750 19 7
at approximately 1342, the vessel departed Subaim, Indonesia,
bound for her discharge port in Yangjiang, China. Everything
was found normal upon departure with the stability of the
vessel intact [30].
During the voyage, on 9 August, the cargo in hold
number 4 was inspected and found to be normal. No further
inspectionswere performed.On the same day, theMaster was
informed to monitor a tropical depression developing in the
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Table 4: Cargo distribution of the Trans Summer when departing
Subaim, Indonesia [30].
Cargo hold number Quantity of nickelore (tonnes)
1 10,708
2 11,602
3 9,948
4 11,159
5 11,333
Total 54750
Philippines. On 10 August, the tropical depression developed
into typhoon “Utor,” which was predicted to make landfall
close to Trans Summer’s discharge port in Yangjiang, China.
Typhoon precautionary measures were then executed by the
crew [30].
On 12 August at 1540, the Master altered course towards
WanshanQuanDao, China (about 100miles fromYangjiang),
to shelter from the typhoon. On 13 August at 2000, after
anchoring 2 nautical miles off the coast, easterly winds
increased to force of 8 to 9 and wave height increased to
approximately 5 to 6 meters. The rolling and yawing of the
vessel at this time were 10 degrees with increasing periods
[30].
Early morning on 14 August, the wind was continuing at
force 9 blowing in an easterly direction and the vessel was
yawing about 10 degrees and rolling about 7 to 8 degrees.
At 0757, the wind was now blowing from the southeast at
force 9 with wave heights about 4 to 6 meters. The distance
to typhoon centre was about 120 nautical miles. At 1000, the
wind force intensified to force 10 with wave heights up to 7
meters. At 1010, a high wave rushed from the starboard side
causing the vessel to heel port side more than 20 degrees
immersing the deck edge in water.The vessel then rolled back
and stayed listing about 10 degrees to port. The listing to port
then increased to 15 degrees soon afterwards and persisted
[30].
Ballast was then used to try to correct the list but it was
mistakenly pumped into the starboard top tanks instead of
the double bottom tanks causing the vessels centre of gravity
to increase. At 1030, when the vessel listed to port about 17
degrees, the second officer transmitted a distress signal under
Master’s order and life rafts and the lifeboat were prepared for
launching. The Master announced abandon ship at 1105 the
same day [30]. The track of “Utor” on 14 August at 1200 can
be seen in Figure 20.
As the vessel listed to port more than 22 degrees, the
Master ordered all crewmembers to jump into the sea from
the stern deck and board the inflated life rafts. As rescue
operations commenced, the vessel listed to port more than
90 degrees and subsequently sank on 14 August at 1156. Views
from a rescue helicopter can be seen in Figures 21 and 22.The
vessel had dredged the anchor more than half a nautical mile
north-west from its original position.
Fortunately, helicopters and vessels sent to the location of
the Trans Summer rescued all crewmembers, but the deck log
along with other statutory documents was lost at sea [30].
2.6.2. Investigation Conclusions. The following are the main
conclusions from the investigation into the sinking of the
Trans Summer [30].
(1) The requirements of IMSBC Code for the cargo of
nickel ore, under groups A and B, were not strictly
followed. The cargo was loaded despite the moisture
content, which exceeded the transportable moisture
limit of 34.8%.
(2) The safety shipboard procedures for loading and
carriage of nickel ore were not followed. The relevant
procedures were as follows:
(a) The procedure for handling of cargo.
(b) The instruction of handling of bulk cargo which
may liquefy.
(c) The requirement of cargo care at sea.
(d) The instruction for preventing strong wind.
(e) The voyage instruction.
(3) Liquefaction of cargo inside cargo holds while the
anchored vessel experienced rolling at the anchorage,
compounded by worsening weather and sea condi-
tion due to approaching of typhoon and mistakenly
pumping water into ballast tank.
(4) Master’s assessment to select the shelter for the vessel
to anchor was not appropriate. The place selected by
theMaster could shelter thewind from the north only.
The vessel could not shelter from the south-easterly
strong wind and waves when the typhoon “Utor” was
passing the south of the vessel.
(5) The moisture content certificate was issued by the
shipper instead of local administration or indepen-
dent organization (or authorized organization).
(6) The crewwas not trained and therefore not competent
to carry out Oven Drying Testing on board to verify
the moisture content of the cargo before loading.
2.7. Case Study 7: Bulk Jupiter. Built in 2006, the Bahama flag
Bulk Jupiter (IMO: 9339947) was a handymax bulk carrier
with a summer deadweight of 56,009 tonnes [32]. The vessel,
which had a length of 190m, breadth of 32m, and draught of
13m, had five cargo holds serviced by four on-board cranes
[28]. The Bulk Jupiter can be seen in Figure 23.
2.7.1. Summary of Incident. On 12 December 2014, the Bulk
Jupiter arrived at the Port of Kuantan, Malaysia, seen in
Figure 24, to begin loading a cargo of bauxite from a berth.
The cargo loading operations were delayed due to heavy and
prolonged rainfall until 17 December at 2100, at which point
loading of holds numbers 1, 3, 4, and 5 commenced. Loading
of hold number 2 commenced on 18 December [28].
The east coast of Malaysia had endured record-breaking
rainfall over the month of December, recording the highest
monthly rainfall in the history of Kuantan at 1806.4mm over
a 22-day period, as seen in Figure 25. The loading operations
continued for an extended period of time due to heavy rain
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Figure 20: Track of “Utor” on 14 August at 1200 (predicted track in red) [30].
Figure 21: View from rescue helicopter as the Trans Summer listed
45 degrees to port [30].
Figure 22: View from rescue helicopter as the Trans Summer listed
90 degrees to port [30].
Figure 23: The Bulk Jupiter [28].
Figure 24: Port of Kuantan, Malaysia (source: Google Maps).
and technical delays. During periods of rain, vessels generally
close their hatch covers to prevent anymoisture fromentering
cargo holds and maintain the cargo in a dry condition.
However, any cargo left on the quayside is left uncovered and
therefore exposed to the elements. It is very likely that the
moisture content of the bauxite increased during this time
[28].
Loading of Bauxite onto bulk carriers at the Port of
Kuantan is achieved using the on-board cranes, as seen in
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Figure 25: December rainfall at the Port of Kuantan, Malaysia [28].
Figure 26. The bauxite is transported to the port on load
trucks where they either store the cargo in stockpiles or stor-
age facilities or transport the bauxite directly to the quayside.
Noted in the investigation was that during transport and
storage the bauxite is generally not covered to protect it from
rain [28].
There are a number of mines dotted around the Port of
Kuantan with varying sizes of operations. It was also noted
that there was also no covered storage facility at these mines
which affords any protection from the rain or surface water
runoff [28]. At the time of loading there was no transportable
moisture limit test performed on the bauxite as in the IMSBC
Code, under the individual schedule for bauxite, it did not
state the cargo was potentially liquefiable [19].
On 30 December at 2124, the Bulk Jupiter left Kuantan,
Malaysia, bound for Qingdao, China, with 46,400 tonnes
of bauxite on board and stability intact. After clearing the
breakwater, the vessel was observed to be rolling about 2 to
3 degrees in low swell. The pilot did not note any abnormal
behaviour in the way the vessel handled while she was being
pulled off the berth or while being manoeuvred through the
port and channel [28].
On 31 December, part way into the voyage, the weather
deteriorated. Wind was forecast north-east at a force of 6 to
7, wind speed 24 to 34 knots, and sea state from 4 to 6 and
with an averagewave height of 2.2m.On 1 January, theMaster
received a weather forecast that included alternate waypoints
for the vessel to travel to reduce the exposure to gale force
winds and waves between 2.5 to 4m from a tropical storm in
the north east [28].The route of the Bulk Jupiter and location
the bulk carrier lost can be seen in Figure 27.
On 2 January 2015 at approximately 0600, the Chief Cook
awoke and noted the weather was starting to deteriorate and
the vessel was rolling more heavily than the previous day. At
approximately 0640, the general alarmwas sounded followed
by an announcement by the Master directing all crew to
proceed to the bridge. The Chief Cook made his way to
the bridge but was told by fellow crewmembers to instead
proceed to the port side lifeboat [28].
At 0654, a distress signal was sent out by the Bulk Jupiter,
which initiated search and rescue operations. As the Chief
Cook returned to his cabin to collect some belongings, he felt
the vessel suddenly start to roll more heavily, particularly to
starboard. As he left his cabin, the vessel suffered a blackout
and emergency lights illuminated. The vessel then stopped
rolling and adopted a 45-degree list to the starboard side.
After meeting the Master, they both abandoned the vessel on
the starboard side [28].
The Bulk Jupiter was founded southeast of Vietnam
between the time of the distress signal and 0700. As the search
for survivors continued throughout the day, at 1556, the Chief
Cook was recovered. Search and rescue operations ceased on
the 06 January. The Chief Cook was the only survivor of the
19 crewmembers on board [28].
Bauxite cargo in the hold of another bulk carrier, the
Orchid Island, which left the Port of Kuantan on 1 January
2015, shortly after the Bulk Jupiter, can be seen in Figure 28.
This cargo of bauxite was suspected to have liquefied during
the voyage. Note the extensive “splatter” on the sides of the
cargo hold. An additional photo, seen in Figure 29, taken
from the Medi Okinawa shows bauxite on the quayside
open to the elements. The Medi Okinawa arrived at Kuantan
shortly before the Bulk Jupiter but sailed on 21 January 2015,
after discharging the cargo of bauxite that was loaded because
the cargo failed to meet the description contained in the
declaration provided [28].
2.7.2. Investigation Conclusions. The following are the main
conclusions from the investigation into the sinking of the
Bulk Jupiter [28].
(1) There is significant documentary evidence to identify
that the 46,400 t of bauxite loaded over the course of
the 13-day period had an average moisture content of
21.3%. Despite this, there is no physical evidence to
confirm what caused the vessel to adopt an unrecov-
erable list to starboard and subsequent capsize.
(2) It was found that the cargo declarations were con-
sidered generic, including the declared 10% moisture
content of the cargo. This was found when compar-
isons weremade between the Bulk Jupiter’s cargo dec-
laration and declarations of the bulk carriers Orchid
Island and Medi Okinawa.
(3) Communications between the Master and the com-
pany ship manager indicated the Master had a lack
of understanding of the practical method for deter-
mining excessive moisture content of a bulk cargo,
specifically the “Can Test.”
(4) In total 186.55 hours of loadingwas lost due to rainfall,
the equivalent of 7 days of loading over the period.
The infrastructure available to adequately store and
transport bauxite in Kuantan increased the exposure
of the bauxite to the elements. Despite the crew’s dili-
gent response to the rain by continually opening and
closing the hatch covers to reduce the ingress of water,
the cargo remained exposed while on the quayside, in
stockpiles, and in the trucks.
(5) An independent inspection was not requested by the
Master to verify the properties of the cargo prior to
loading on board. Considering the extreme weather
conditions and storage facilities available it was
acknowledged that the cargo was very wet and that
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Figure 26: Cargo being loaded onto a bulk carrier from the quayside at the Port of Kuantan, Malaysia [28].
Date Time (UTC) Lat N Long E Av. spd. last
6 hours (kts)
Distance
30 Dec 14 1200 Departing Kuantan
1434 03 59.1 103 40.0 2.4 14.7
2034 04 18.7 104 35.9 9.9 59.2
31 Dec 14 234 04 33.7 105 37.8 10.6 63.7
834 05 02.4 106 23.1 8.9 53.6
1434 05 59.3 106 45.9 10.2 61.3
2034 06 54.9 107 08.4 10.0 60.0
1 Jan 15 234 07 38.9 107 38.5 8.9 53.3
834 08 15.6 108 09.8 8.0 48.1
1434 08 34.0 108 39.5 6.3 37.7
2034 08 54.6 109 04.9 4.9 29.6
Sank 2254 09 01.0 109 15.5 5.4 12.7
Figure 27: Route of the Bulk Jupiter and location lost [28] (source: Google Maps).
measures to protect the cargo on shore from further
rain were not effective in preventing further wetting.
The absence of an independent inspection resulted in
the cargo being loaded without its physical proper-
ties and moisture content being verified against the
parameters of the IMSBC Code schedule or the cargo
declaration form.
(6) Every 48 hours a report should be generated and pro-
vided to the Charterers if any water had been drained
from the bilges during the transit in accordance with
the Charterers Voyage Instructions. No correspon-
dence has been received from the Charterers and
therefore it cannot be determined whether the cargo
was draining free water and/or whether anyone on
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Figure 28: View of bauxite cargo in hold number 4 of the Orchid Island after voyage from Kuantan, Malaysia, to Qingdao, China [28].
Figure 29: Bauxite cargo quayside exposed to the elements. Photo
taken from the Medi Okinawa at Port of Kuantan, Malaysia [28].
board was aware and was taking action to discharge
any water accumulating in the hold bilges.
(7) The previous class and special survey inspections
indicate no structural integrity failures; the vessel had
fulfilled diligently all prior certification conformity
requirements and as such the likelihood of a catas-
trophic structural failure is considered low.
(8) Having presumed that the probability of structural
failure is low, as a singular causal event, it can be con-
cluded that either liquefaction or a free surface effect
induced an unrecoverable list. When considering the
conditions in the order that they occurred, there can
only be very few circumstances that cause a vessel to
capsize so quickly with minimal warning. Due to the
reliability of the information provided on the cargo
declaration, in particular the composition of cargo,
it has been determined that the probability of lique-
faction occurring is considered high. A further causal
event, for which it would only occur if the cargo is suf-
ficiently compacted, is a free surface effect generated
on top of the cargo. Notwithstanding this, if the cargo
had liquefied, a free surface effect will also occur,
with similar catastrophic effect. Another related phe-
nomenon associated with both liquefaction and free
surface effect occurs when the cargo slides to one side
of the vessel and fails to return to where it came from.
This particular effect would be inevitable once the
angle of heel is greater than the angle of repose of the
cargo, if untrimmed or if the cohesion between the
particles of the cargo is insufficient when an angle of
heel is induced.
3. Discussion and Recommendations
As discussed in Section 1, there are many factors that influ-
ence the liquefaction potential of cargoes. Although this is the
case, themoisture content is one that can change significantly
during extraction, storage, and transportation. It can change
significantly based on the implemented procedures and the
actions of the people involved in these processes. Despite the
fact that some reports indicate that excessmoisturewithin the
cargo is only assumed to have been the cause of the incident,
we will assume that in all cases excess moisture within the
cargo was the cause of the incident.
Determining if a cargo is safe to transport is relatively
simple if the correct sampling and testing techniques are
implemented. The importance of sampling is commonly
overlooked but is the most imperative aspect of any labora-
tory testing [38]. If the sample does not represent the cargo
being transported then the results will be misleading. There
are many techniques for sampling stockpiles depending on
the type of material and standards being followed (i.e., iron
ore [39]). Section 4.6 of the IMSBC Code outlines sampling
procedures that are to be followed when sampling stockpiles
consigned to vessels [19]. It is recommended these sampling
techniques be used when determining the moisture content
and transportable moisture limit of a cargo.
Once a representative sample of the cargo has been
obtained, prior to the arrival of a vessel, it is recommended
to determine both the average moisture content and trans-
portable moisture limit of the stockpile. For bauxite and
nickel ore, there are no test methods specifically designed to
determine the transportable moisture limit. Until such a test
is developed, it is recommended to utilize either the penetra-
tion test or flow table test stated in Appendix 2 of the IMSBC
Code [19]. These tests are recommended as they measure the
direct liquefaction potential with visual observations [11, 21].
Like iron ore fines and coal, it is recommended that a test
be developed that is specifically designed for determining the
transportable moisture limit of bauxite and nickel ore and the
IMSBC Code specify mandatory testing of all variations of
these cargoes [40–44].
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From the reports, it is clear that the ingress of water into
the cargo is a major problem during transportation, storage,
and loading, prior to a vessels departure from port. It is
commonly reported that trucks and barges are not equipped
with tarpaulins to protect the cargo from rain. Additionally,
stockpiles at the mines and quayside also lack this essential
equipment. Cargoes such as nickel ore and bauxite can
contain a significant amount of fine particles [45, 46]. This
property can also increase the cargoes’ hygroscopic proper-
ties [47]. Protective equipment should be easily accessible and
readily available for use when rain is forecast. Masters should
insist on checking if this protective equipment is available, as
if this equipment is unavailable it can be an indication of poor
practices at the site and therefore the Master should be extra
vigilant.
“Solar drying” of stockpiles of cargo is an ineffective
method for rapidly reducing the moisture content. The
method merely dries the surface of the stockpile leaving the
core of the stockpile unaffected [48, 49]. If “solar drying” is
to be carried out, it is recommended that the cargo be evenly
spread on a pad and frequently turned over using a bulldozer
or excavator to increase the rate of evaporation and distri-
bution of desiccation. Drying or dewatering a cargo can take
some time to accomplish; therefore, prior to arrival of a vessel,
it is recommended that the moisture content of the cargo is
determined and compared with the transportable moisture
limit in order to decide if drying is needed.
Moisture content testing is inexpensive when compared
to the cost that will be incurred if a vessel is lost due to a
cargo liquefying or shifting. After the arrival of a vessel, prior
to loading, the exact moisture content of the cargo should
be known. Section 4.5 of the IMSBC Code states that the
interval between moisture content sampling should not be
more than seven days prior to loading [19].This statement can
be misleading as the moisture content of a cargo can change
significantlywithin seven days. If rainfall has occurred during
this time or the air humidity has been high, it is highly recom-
mended that a few hours prior to loading additional moisture
content tests be performed for confirmation.
It is recommended that an accredited independent testing
laboratory is available to perform the required moisture
content and transportable moisture limit testing. These lab-
oratories may be located at the mine or port and be under the
supervision of the International Maritime Organization and
funded by the export company. After testing, if the Master
suspects that a cargo may contain a moisture content that
exceeds the transportable moisture limit then it is recom-
mended that a “Can Test” is also performed on the cargo.
The “CanTest” is an in situ complementary test procedure
for determining the liquefaction potential of a cargo given in
the IMSBC Code [19]. The “Can Test” provides an estimate
on whether the cargo may exceed the transportable moisture
limit. Masters should be familiar with the “Can Test” and
moisture content test if they are frequently transporting
potentially liquefiable cargoes. The “Can Test” is usually the
last line of defense for preventing cargoes exceeding the
transportable moisture limit being loaded onto a bulk carrier.
Failure of this test indicates the cargo is not safe to transport
and should be rejected unless it is proven that the cargo has
a moisture content less than the transportable moisture limit.
Even then, extra precautions should be taken and the validity
of the transportable moisture limit test should be questioned.
Once a cargo is loaded onto a bulk carrier, it is still sus-
ceptible to the ingress ofmoisture. During loading, it is highly
recommended that when rain is forecast all cargo holds be
closed. The ingress of water into the holds can sometimes
be removed by bilge pumps, but due to some cargoes ability
to retain moisture it can be preserved within and migrate
out during transportation.
During transportation, dynamic loading, caused by the
ocean waves and vessel vibrations, can cause a cargo to
densify. Dynamic loading can reduce the voids of a cargo and
in turn this increases the degree of saturation and induces
changes in the pore pressures within the material. A cargo
that is highly saturated may be at risk of liquefying and
shiftingwithin the hold of a bulk carrier [50]. InAppendix 1 of
the IMSBC Code, it is recommended that cargoes be checked
regularly to make sure that there are no changes in the state
of the material. The IMSBC Code states “The appearance of
the surface of the cargo shall be checked regularly during a
voyage. If free water above the cargo or fluid state of the cargo
is observed during a voyage, the Master shall take appropriate
actions to prevent cargo shifting and potential capsize of the
ship, and give consideration to seeking emergency entry into a
place of refuge” [19].
As the degree of saturation of a cargo increases, so does
the degree to which it can densify. Densification may cause
excess moisture to migrate to the surface. It has been proven
that this process occurs graduallywith the speed related to the
magnitude and time of dynamic loading. It is recommended
that regular check on the cargo be made, with frequently
increasing checks being performed if the vessel experiences
rough sea states.
4. Conclusion
The objective of this study was to investigate the collective
causes of liquefaction of solid bulk cargoes on board bulk
carriers in order to make recommendations to prevent future
incidents from occurring. This was achieved by analysing
the available investigative reports relating to the incidents,
focusing on the key findings and exploring the effect of
excessmoisturewithin the cargo.This study placed significant
emphasis on the importance of preventing ingress of water
into the cargo during transportation, loading, and storage.
Although the International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes
Code (IMSBCCode) was implemented on amandatory basis
from January 2011, incidents involving liquefaction ofmineral
bulk cargoes continue to occur.
The findings of this study indicate that liquefaction inci-
dents on board bulk carriers are caused by a combination of
below par procedural implementation along with insufficient
knowledge about liquefaction of cargoes and the possible
consequences of transporting themwith a highmoisture con-
tent. Sampling and testing techniques thatmay not bemanda-
tory are necessary in order to reduce liquefaction incidents
from occurring.
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Many mines where bauxite and nickel ore are being
extracted are very basic and situated in remote locations.
This makes it hard for surveyors and experts to attend them.
Hence, it is not easy to arrange for cargo samples to be tested
independently due to the lack of reliable laboratories in these
remote areas. Due to this, the responsibly falls back onto
the individual mine operators, the port authority, and the
Master of the vessel to make sure that the test results are valid
and representative of the cargo as well as that all necessary
precautions are taken to reduce the potential for the cargo to
liquefy.
Although it is not mandatory to determine the trans-
portable moisture limit of certain bauxite and nickel ore car-
goes, it is highly recommended to do so as incidents are con-
tinuing to occurwhen transporting these cargoes on bulk car-
riers. Additionally, although a cargo may appear dry, it could
contain excessive moisture and become saturated under
dynamic loading. It is essential that the moisture content of
a cargo is kept low to reduce the risk of liquefaction or cargo
shift and that further research is performed to determine
the physical properties and system variables that increase the
liquefaction potential of these cargoes.
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